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European Rule Adoption in Central and Eastern Europe: a comparative analysis of 
Agricultural Water Regulation in Serbia 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Regulation of agriculture’s use of water in Serbia is comparatively analysed as a basis for 
engaging in a wider debate on European rule adoption. The paper assesses the validity of 
three models (external incentives, policy learning / lesson drawing and Mediterranean 
syndrome), which seek to explain patterns of (non)compliance. While such models tend to 
be presented as competing frameworks, evidence suggests that this is inappropriate. Survey 
and interview data reveal a substantial implementation deficit for environmental regulation 
in Serbia, bearing several common characteristics with the Mediterranean syndrome. In 
this case problems of compliance with European rules cannot be divorced from domestic 
regulatory failure.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Europeanisation has been defined broadly as a ‘process by which states adopt EU rules’ 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005a, p.7). The accession of countries from Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE), due to the number of states, their relatively lower levels of economic 
development and historical legacy of state socialism, represents the most ambitious exercise in 
Europeanisation to date. While the ability of Europeanisation to stimulate domestic change or 
transformation has been extensively studied, the focus has largely been restricted to existing 
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Member States (i.e. post accession). This is despite the fact that external requirements have 
shaped profoundly the accession process (Schimmelfennig, 2002), with the ability to join 
dependent on reforms prior to membership.  Specifically, progress in accession negotiations 
between the CEE states and the EU has been measured in terms of harmonisation with the acquis 
communautaire, the EU’s legislative corpus. The acquis is divided into 31 chapters, providing 
the structure for accession negotiations, with formal offers of membership not being extended 
until negotiations on adopting the entire acquis communautaire have been concluded. 
Notwithstanding some bargaining over transition periods, accession negotiations are thus 
‘negotiations only by name’ (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005b, p.224) and the bulk of 
legal harmonisation (approximation) should occur prior to actual membership (Gorton et al. 
2005).  
Enlargement to the east remains uncompleted. The first wave occurred in 2004 with eight 
states from CEE joining the EU. In 2007, Bulgaria and Romania also acceded, and Stabilisation 
and Association Agreements have been signed or are being negotiated with Western Balkan 
states, designed to foster their integration into EU structures. If these plans are realised all of the 
successor states of the pre-1991 Yugoslavia will become members of the EU. This would imply 
an EU with in excess of thirty Member States (MS). The incorporation of countries from the 
Western Balkans has been perceived as the most challenging, and potentially most rewarding 
given their recent history of ethnic conflict, war and economic collapse. 
For most of the 1990s Serbia, for instance, was a pariah state, ostracised by the 
international community and starved of external funding.1 With the downfall of the Milošević 
regime, many contend that political stability and economic recovery in Serbia and the wider 
region can be best achieved via EU membership (Gowan, 2007). The process of EU accession 
has been initiated: a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU was signed in April 
2008. However, the post-Milošević era has not witnessed the radical break or clear emergence of 
                                                 
1
 Until 1991, Serbia was one of six republics that comprised the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). 
Following the break up of the SFRY, a Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was established in 1992. The latter 
comprised Serbia (including the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo) and Montenegro. Serbia became 
an independent entity after Montenegro declared independence in 2006.  
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a new pro-European political consensus that optimists envisaged. As a consequence, many doubt 
Serbia’s ability to meet the obligations of EU membership (Boonstra, 2006) and fear that much 
of its population remains enthralled to a reactionary nationalism that blames the West for its 
current ills. EU policy makers thus face a thorny dilemma. On the one hand, Serbia’s precarious 
political situation makes the need for locking it into peaceful internal and external political 
relationships a pressing requirement, giving momentum to EU accession negotiations. On the 
other hand, there are real concerns about admitting an insufficiently reformed new MS, incapable 
of accepting the obligations of membership, thus threatening to dilute the legitimacy of the 
European project. 
An illuminating policy domain for studying Europeanisation is that of agricultural water 
management as it is a field where European competence is advanced and goes to the heart of the 
EU as a ‘regulatory state’ (Majone, 1996). In general, environmental policy has been seen as one 
of the most problematic for acceding states, in terms of both the costs of compliance and need 
for administrative capacity building (Holzinger and Knoepfel, 2000; Jehlička and Tickle, 2004; 
Skjærseth and Wettestad, 2002; World Bank, 2000). In this paper we analyse the degree to which 
Serbia’s agricultural water policy has been Europeanised. The analysis draws on three models 
(external incentives, policy learning / lesson drawing and Mediterranean syndrome) which seek 
to explain the degree of compliance / non-compliance with EU rules. To pin down the evaluation 
and elaborate the theory, the Serbian situation is compared with evidence for CEE states which 
acceded to the EU in 2004 (referred to collectively as CEEC2004). Serbia was chosen as an 
exemplary case that exhibits some tendencies which are common to most CEE countries (such as 
low salience of environmental policy and ministries) but also a unique problem of international 
socialisation.  Our aim is not to provide a detailed review of EU policy, but rather to analyse the 
ability of competing models of European rule compliance to explain variations in outcomes 
between the Serbian and other CEE cases. 
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Models of European Rule Adoption 
 
To date no consensus has emerged as to the mechanisms and conditions under which non-, new 
and existing MS adopt EU rules. We therefore draw on three models of European rule adoption, 
which are summarised in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1: Explanatory models of European rule adoption 
 
 External incentives 
model 
Policy learning / lesson 
drawing model 
Mediterranean 
syndrome 
Conceptualisation Rationalist bargaining 
model: government adopts 
EU rules if benefits 
exceed adoption costs 
Social constructivism. 
Government adopts EU 
rules if  persuaded of the 
appropriateness of EU 
rules 
States fundamentally 
vary in their ability to 
maintain public goods 
Unit of analysis Legal harmonisation Rule adoption Practical implementation 
/ enforcement of rules by 
the nation state 
Factors affecting 
compliance 
The balance of costs and 
benefits of compliance 
Degree to which EU rules 
are seen domestically as 
superior, legitimate, and 
achievable. Influence of 
EU centred “epistemic 
communities” 
(Non)-compliance 
depends on  nature of  
‘civic culture’, and the 
probity of administrative 
structures and traditions  
Assumptions Rule adjustment is costly. 
Domestic equilibrium is 
upset by incentives EU 
provides 
Learning prompted by 
domestic disequilibrium, 
favouring departure from 
status quo. Discursive 
adoption is sincere so that 
formal and behavioural 
adoption follow suit  
Failure to effectively 
implement European 
legislation is rooted in 
domestic institutional 
failure and political 
culture. 
 
Source: own construction 
 
 
External incentive model 
This approach assumes that states make a rational choice as to whether to adopt EU-rules based 
on the perceived costs and benefits of compliance. From this two implications can be derived. 
First, the relative magnitude of costs and benefits varies between states and it is these variations 
which explain whether MS are leaders, laggards or ‘refuseniks’ in complying with EU rules. 
Secondly, compliance costs will be lower where there is an initial high degree of fit between 
domestic and EU rules. This has been conceptualised by Börzel (2000; 2003) as ‘the goodness of 
fit’ between national political-administrative arrangements and EU requirements. Compliance 
will be less likely, therefore, where adaptation pressure, defined by Knill (1998: p.24) as ‘the 
 5
degree of institutional incompatibility between national structures or practices and supernational 
requirements’, is higher.  
 
Following this model, the EU can influence a state’s actions by altering the costs and 
benefits of compliance. For non-Member States, the EU’s ultimate sanction is withholding 
membership but it can also apply conditions to aid and then withholds ‘rewards’ if a particular 
state fails to comply - what Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005a: p.4) term ‘reinforcement by 
punishment’. Conversely, compliant states may receive additional benefits in the form of 
improved access to EU funds (reinforcement by support). The EU’s ability to improve 
compliance therefore depends on the credibility of its conditionality. 
This analytical approach has largely been followed by International Relations scholars, 
who study choices as the adjustment of domestic laws.  However, legal harmonisation is only a 
very partial measure of domestic impact that ignores practical adherence and enforcement. This 
is problematic as it is typically practical enforcement which accounts for the majority of the costs 
of rule adoption. Moreover, an analysis of practical adherence to EU rules requires ‘on the 
ground’ scrutiny which ‘is something that the International Relations and EU scholars…are 
rarely prepared or equipped to do’ (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005a: p.4). The model 
does not consider whether implementation deficits of both domestic and EU rules are generated 
by common causal factors. 
Policy learning / lesson drawing model 
Informed by social constructivism, the policy learning model conceptualises rule adoption as 
depending on the degree to which aspiring and actual MS identify with the EU and regard it as 
legitimate. A government will therefore adopt EU rules if it is persuaded that they are 
appropriate (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005a). The persuasiveness of the EU will depend 
on the extent to which a MS shares the constitutive norms and values of the Union and regards 
its institutions as legitimate rule-making entities. For Checkel (2001) the decision making of 
CEE states cannot be reduced to a pure bargaining model but rather depends on the EU being 
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regarded as an ‘aspiration group’ to which others want to belong. Under this approach the EU 
will strengthen compliance by improving the transparency and fairness of rule-making 
procedures, although deep integration ultimately depends upon a mindset of shared values and 
identity.  
As the policy learning model is predicated on a process of arguing and persuasion, it 
assumes that adoption will be initially discursive but where this is sincere, ‘formal and 
behavioural adoption should follow suit quickly’ (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005a, p.20). 
Similarly, Risse et al. (1999) conceptualise the dynamics of international socialisation as a 
‘spiral model’ of change, whereby discursive interaction leads to formal adoption, followed by 
rule-consistent behaviour (behavioural effect).  
Bomberg (2007) distinguishes three types of learning: political, instrumental and social. 
Political learning focuses on the creation of sophisticated policy advocates, while instrumental 
learning is more targeted, focusing on specific policy instruments. Social learning is less direct 
than the latter, shaping the climate (agendas and processes) in a particular policy field. The 
learning process involves both pupils and teachers. Lesson drawing which is often used 
interchangeably with policy learning, differs from the latter in that it focuses on ‘informal or 
more institutionalized exchanges through which policy-makers, dissatisfied with current policy 
or practice… mimic best practise employed elsewhere’  (Bomberg, 2007, p.255). In the context 
of Europeanisation, it therefore pertains to states voluntarily copying EU rules to meet domestic 
needs and problems, rather than through EU activities per se (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 
2005a).  Faced with domestic difficulties, policy-makers evaluate alternative policies and rules 
and assess whether they can be plausibly transferred (Rose, 1991). Lesson drawing may result in 
copying (direct transfer), emulation (adoption with adjustment to different circumstances), 
combination (mixtures of policies from different places) and inspiration (non-domestic policies 
stimulating reform but not the final outcome) (Jacoby, 2004).  
The degree to which a state engages in policy learning will be determined by three 
factors. First, the level of dissatisfaction with current domestic rules determines the urgency with 
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which states search for alternative solutions. Second, the capacity of policy makers to understand 
and engage with alternative models is critical. Particularly in fields depending on technical 
expertise and specialist knowledge, ‘epistemic communities’ provide an important bridge for 
policy learning. Haas (1992, p.3) defines an epistemic community as a ‘network of professionals 
with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to 
policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area.’ Finally, policy makers have to 
assess positively that the alternative approaches of others would be successful in dealing with 
domestic problems, i.e. that conditions are similar enough. According to this approach, 
compliance with EU rules in CEE will therefore depend on the level of domestic dissatisfaction, 
engagement in epistemic communities and perceived transferability. 
 
‘Mediterranean syndrome’ 
An early and controversial contribution to the debate on implementation of EU rules, specifically 
addressing common environmental policy, was made by La Spina and Sciortino (1993), who 
argued that a ‘Mediterranean Syndrome’ pervaded the Southern MS, which militated against 
effective environmental policies. La Spina and Sciortino (1993) argued that there are three 
aspects to the ‘Mediterranean Syndrome’ which lead to non-compliance with both domestic and 
EU rules: a ‘civic culture’ that sanctions non-cooperative and non-compliant behaviour, 
administrative structures and traditions that undermine the enforcement of regulative policies, 
and a fragmented, reactive and party-dominated administration populated with delegitimised 
bureaucrats permeable ‘to clientelism and corruption’ (p.220). States characterised by the 
Mediterranean Syndrome suffer from significant implementation deficits at the local level. To 
reveal the true picture of non-compliance requires the study of ‘real regulation’: what happens 
after the enactment of legislation, how it is implemented and enforced in practice (Henderson, 
2003). 
Regulatory failure was particularly likely to occur, according to La Spina and Sciortino, 
as many beneficial environmental resources are public goods, the existence of which depends on 
 8
an organisational structure capable of promoting collective action. While not seeing collective 
action as entirely dependent on the state, La Spina and Sciortino argue that government is often 
essential in providing and enforcing positive and negative incentives. To provide effective 
incentives, states require detailed technical knowledge and administrative capacity. While 
introducing the Mediterranean Syndrome as an ‘ideal type’, the authors argue Southern states 
had repeatedly failed to deliver effective incentives and ensure the production of environmental 
public goods. These difficulties were perceived to be endemic.  Failure to effectively implement 
European legislation parallels the experience with similar national initiatives and is rooted in 
domestic institutional failure and political culture. 
 
Methods, data and sources 
 
The analysis is split into three periods: the socialist era, the early to mid-1990s, and the 
late 1990s onwards. For the socialist era, the analysis considers the former Yugoslavia as a 
whole, given Serbia’s then status as a republic of SFRY. For the latter eras, (the early to mid-
1990s, and the late 1990s onwards) we restrict the focus to Serbia. For the late 1990s onwards, 
the paper considers recent evidence on rule adoption at the farm level in Serbia, combining 
interviews with elite actors and survey responses from farmers on their water management 
practices. Interviews were conducted with 17 key policy actors (current and former officials of 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Management, Ministry of Science and 
Environmental Protection, the Water Inspectorate and other Serbian institutes, European 
agencies and commercial producers). These are supplemented by responses from 165 Serbian 
farmers to a face-to-face survey of their water and environmental management practices, 
conducted in 2005/6. This combination of elite and ‘on the ground perspectives’ is designed to 
capture both the formal process of legal transposition and international harmonisation and 
practical enforcement. The methodology is consistent therefore with the scope recommended by 
Henderson (2003) for studying real regulation. 
 9
The Serbian situation is compared with evidence for the CEEC2004, drawing on material 
from an earlier EU funded project on Sustainable Agriculture in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEESA - project no QLK5-1999-01611), which is described in greater detail elsewhere 
(Karaczun, 2003; Kováč et al. 2003; Zemeckis et al. 2003; Zellei et al. 2005; Gorton et al. 
2005). As in the Serbian study, the research focused on the Europeanisation of agricultural water 
management, drawing on documentary evidence and interviews with a range of key actors 
(Ministry officials, specialist agencies, farmers etc.). The CEEC2004 cases are not presented in 
depth but are drawn on for comparative purposes as part of the evaluation of theory. For each of 
the three eras the paper assesses the validity of the models to explain compliance / non-
compliance with European rules.   
 
 
Comparative Analysis of European rule adoption in Serbia 
 
The socialist era 
Regarding environmental rule adoption, both similarities and contrasts between Yugoslavia and 
the CEEC2004 during the socialist era can be drawn. Compared to other CEE states, Yugoslav 
environmental law was better developed (Jancar, 1987; Clarke, 2001). For instance, by the mid-
1980s environmental protection in Yugoslavia was subject to some 400 laws and about 1000 
local, regional, state and federal regulations (Federal Coordinating Council on the Environment, 
1989; Pravdić, 1992a).  Every republic of the former Yugoslavia had by the mid 1970s 
environmental legislation covering all the main policy domains (air, water, soil, chemical and 
toxic waste, natural and cultural heritage protection, and spatial planning). In fact by the 1980s, 
the legal framework for environmental management in Yugoslavia was far better developed than 
in the Southern European states, prior to their accession to the EU. For example Spanish 
environmental policy ‘owes its existence to EU membership’ (Aguilar Fernández, 2004, p.172) 
and prior to membership, Portugal lacked ‘any consistent legislative framework to cover even 
the classic goals of ex post pollution control and waste disposal’ (La Spina and Sciortino, 1993, 
p.222). Accession in these southern cases was thus largely the trigger for the adoption of 
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environmental regulations rather than as in CEE where accession led to the extensive 
replacement or revision of existing laws. 
In contrast to other parts of CEE, Yugoslavia engaged in policy learning from the west 
and senior environmental officials were much more likely to be part of western / international 
epistemic communities. By the mid-1980s, 37 international environmental protocols and 
conventions had been ratified by Yugoslavia (Pravdić, 1992a). Water legislation and quality 
standards followed the recommendations of the World Health Organisation and the European 
Community (what is now the EU) (see CEC, 1976). There was much interest in harmonizing 
Yugoslav standards of water quality and wastewater treatment with the EU directives, in part 
because of the economic importance of tourists from the EU countries (Pravdić, 1992a). In the 
northern republics, particularly Slovenia, environmental activism and NGO membership was 
high and this formed the basis of a nascent green movement that became an important political 
force at the time of independence (Elliott, 2005). Environmental officials, like most of the 
Yugoslav political-administrative elite, were relatively well educated and travelled. This was 
aided by Yugoslavia’s non-aligned status. 
Similar to the rest of CEE, however, Yugoslavia was characterised by a widespread 
implementation deficit of environmental laws (Jancar, 1985; Jancar, 1987; Pravdić, 1992b). 
Common to other CEE states, environmental goals were subordinate to production objectives 
(Pavlínek and Pickles, 2000; Greenspan Bell, 2004; Schreurs, 2004). There was little official 
recognition that agriculture could be a major source of water pollution, with a widespread belief 
that agri-environmental policy was unwarranted and could only be implemented at the expense 
of food production. Such attitudes were not restricted to CEE but common to many Western 
Ministries of Agriculture and related bodies in the 1970s and early 1980s (Lowe et al. 1997). 
Although Yugoslav legislation, in common with most other CEE countries, mandated fines for 
improper disposal of animal wastes by farms this was rarely enforced. In any case, penalties 
were minor and did not act as a deterrent (Zellei et al. 2005; Jancar-Webster, 1993). 
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Yugoslavia’s implementation deficit differed, however, from the rest of CEE in that it 
was aggravated by its dysfunctional federalism and unique system of self-management (Jancar, 
1985; Jancar-Webster, 1993). The 1974 Yugoslav constitution gave limited federal jurisdiction 
and substantial republican power. Environmental protection became a republican matter, so no 
federal authority was empowered to enforce laws, check standards or recommend common 
criteria (Assembly of Yugoslavia, 1987; Pravdić, 1992b) with inter-republican agencies unable 
to impose environmental obligations on unwilling republics (Jancar-Webster, 1993). Each 
republic developed its own standards and laws so that there was no unified approach to 
environmental protection. Problems stemming from dispersed responsibilities were witnessed, 
for example in waste disposal, with leaching from widely scattered waste-disposal sites leading 
to contamination of aquifers and the water supply of some urban areas (Pravdić, 1992b). 
Self-management also gave considerable scope to districts for the protection of the local 
environment through the passing of regulations, the planning and implementation of pollution 
control measures, and the organisation of their own environmental inspection systems (Jancar-
Webster, 1993). However, every local government unit was required by law to be self-
supporting: in other words it had to raise the money to fund local social welfare programmes 
(pensions, public transport, water systems etc.). Environmental protection was not a mandated 
public service so that each programme had to seek its own funding. As a result special 
relationships tended to develop between local industry and local government with the latter 
guaranteeing the former’s survival through such means as dubious bank loans and lax 
enforcement of regulations, in order that the former might guarantee the latter’s ability to meet 
its mandated budget.  In rural areas, eutrophication and pollution from inappropriate animal 
waste disposal were not tackled as local authorities did not want to jeopardise the viability of 
large farms, which provided much needed employment and revenue. 
Reviewing environmental regulation during the socialist era in the light of the models of 
Europeanisation, reveals that policy learning was critical for Yugoslavia, creating a rather well 
developed formal legal framework. Policy learning depended on a relatively well funded 
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epistemic community, which looked west rather than east, for inspiration. However this 
community while influential in shaping legislation was unable to prevent a substantial 
implementation deficit, which stemmed from political priorities and Yugoslavia’s specific 
political-administrative structure. In contrast to a common assumption of policy learning models, 
discursive adoption of European rules failed to lead to a commensurate adjustment in behaviour. 
External incentives in relation to agricultural water management were minimal during this era. 
While La Spina and Sciortino’s (1993) theory was not developed for socialist states some 
commonalities with the Mediterranean syndrome can be drawn. A significant implementation 
deficit characterised Yugoslavia and other CEE states, rooted in a civic culture in which 
environmental rules were routinely overridden. In common with the Mediterranean syndrome, 
Yugoslavia’s administrative structures undermined compliance. However, regulatory failure also 
reflected the greater weight given to other, largely production, objectives by a party - industrial 
elite, rather than a complete inability to produce environmental public goods per se. For instance, 
Yugoslavia had a network of reasonably well protected national parks and nature reserves (Zellei 
et al. 2005). 
 
The early and mid 1990s 
After 1989, the CEEC2004 shared the higher order political goal of ‘returning to Europe’, 
specifically membership of the EU and NATO. Regarding the environment, socialist era policy 
was widely seen as a failure, generating an interest in western models of governance which were 
seen as in keeping with a broader process of democratisation (Andonova, 2005). In these 
countries the identification with, and desire for ‘reintegration’ with, Western Europe increased 
the salience of EU rules for policy learning (Andonova, 2005).  
Considering Serbia solely, rather than all of the six former republics of the SFRY, such 
conditions were not present as the higher order political goal was the preservation of Yugoslavia 
or, at the very least, ‘Greater Serbia’. While Serbia did introduce a raft of new laws on 
environmental protection (Nos. 66/91, 83/92, 67/93, 48/94), water (46/91), protection of forests 
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(46/91, 83/92), national parks (39/93, 44/93) and the protection of agricultural land (49/92, 
53/93), these did not incorporate new mechanisms for environment management but were 
concerned with territorial jurisdiction. As such these laws enshrined a principle specified in the 
1990 constitution: that Serbia had competence for environmental protection. Responsibilities 
were transferred from local authorities to republican ministries and their subsidiary agencies.2 
The system of self-management was abandoned.  
During the early 1990s the main mechanism for the transfer of European or other 
Western models of environmental management to the CEEC2004 was policy learning through 
newly established internal and external information exchange networks. A multitude of external 
agents established networks which sought to improve environmental governance in CEE. For 
instance, the ‘Environment for Europe’ process, a series of biannual meetings for European 
environmental ministries and donor agencies was inaugurated in 1991. The U.S. Agency for 
International Development and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) founded a 
Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe (REC). The U.S. EPA also 
funded research on, amongst other environmental studies, farm pollution in Poland (Karaczun, 
2003). Scandinavian countries were particularly active in establishing linkages with the newly 
independent Baltic States, funding a range of forums on environmental matters and projects to 
reduce agricultural run-off. Technical assistance was provided to newly established Ministries of 
the Environment in the Baltic States (Gorton et al. 2005). In terms of Bomberg’s (2007) 
typology, most schemes focused largely on social learning, seeking to promote, often 
inconsistently, the principles of a market economy, sustainable development and good 
agricultural practices.   
Despite in many regards being best placed to assume a leading role in such policy 
networks - through their greater contacts with, and previous lesson drawing from, the west - 
Serbian environmental officials and academics were largely excluded. An ambitious plan for the 
                                                 
2
 In part this reflected that most of the opposition toward Milošević came from Belgrade and the provincial cities, so 
by transferring power to central government, assets and resources were kept out of the hands of opposition elements.   
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development of an environmental information system was drawn up by the Serbian Ministry of 
the Environment (Gburcik, 1993) and some initial funding was forthcoming from the EC and 
USA for environmental projects. However with the imposition of UN sanctions in 1992 access to 
international funding was lost and plans for the expansion of environmental agencies were 
abandoned. Serbia’s pariah status led to its exclusion from nascent post-socialist epistemic 
communities. 
Assessing the early and late 1990s in the light of the models for European rule adoption 
is revealing due to the absence of significant external incentives for CEE. While for the 
CEEC2004 a ‘return to Europe’ remained a higher order political goal, EU membership 
remained too distant a possibility to impact significantly on domestic legislation.  The flow of 
financial resources from the EU to the CEEC2004 was minor compared against later pre-
accession instruments (Jacoby, 2004). Moreover, networks aimed to assist policy learning failed 
to instigate widespread reform of domestic environmental governance (Andonova, 2005). This 
stemmed in part from a lack, in the midst of a severe economic recession, of substantial funding 
from external donors and domestic budgets, and bottom up support from citizens for 
environmental reform (Hicks, 2004; Homeyer, 2004). However such networks provided the basis 
for epistemic policy communities that played an important part in the later EU accession process. 
They also provided funding and status for a small number of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ in CEE who 
championed agri-environmental policy (Gorton et al. 2005). 
Sharp falls in the real budgets afforded to environmental protection agencies exacerbated 
enforcement problems in the early to mid-1990s. In CEE many state monitoring agencies, 
designed for a system of collectivised agriculture, were ill-equipped for dealing with a far more 
fragmented structure of farming. Production of environmental public goods became increasingly 
problematic as economic output and living standards shrank (Zellei et al. 2005). Serbia’s 
government, confronted with international sanctions, ‘officially sanctioned’ non-cooperation 
with its own environmental rules, given its objective to become self-sufficient in food 
production. During the Milošević era, Serbia increasingly resembled the ‘ideal type’ of the 
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Mediterranean syndrome. The probity of administrative structures declined, becoming 
increasingly characterised by clientelism and what Begovic (2005) terms institutionalised 
corruption. Compliance with environmental rules collapsed. 
 
Late 1990s onwards 
If the early and mid 1990s in CEE were characterised by a multitude of environmental networks 
being established by an array of often competing international agencies and donor countries, the 
late 1990s onwards witnessed the emergence of the EU as the focal actor (VanDeveer and 
Carmin, 2004). Policy transfer to the CEEC2004 was governed by their higher order aim of 
gaining membership and the accession process which was largely based on adoption of the 
acquis. The legal transposition process was managed by small groups of senior civil servants and 
selected experts and little engaged national parliaments. The European Commission ignored calls 
for a more flexible approach from the World Bank (2000), which objected that the environmental 
chapter placed excessive burdens on applicant countries. The consequence was significant legal 
reform: for example all of the CEEC2004 states introduced stricter national water protection 
laws as part of the legal harmonisation with the EU (Gorton et al. 2005).  
While adoption of the acquis was non-negotiable, applicant states could apply for the 
implementation of specific EU directives to be delayed (known as a transitional period). In the 
environmental field all of the CEEC2004 states have been granted a transitional period for at 
least one directive (the most common being for treatment of urban waste water) (Skjærseth and 
Wettestad, 2007). However, regarding the directives that are most specific to agri-environmental 
matters, such as the Nitrates and Habitats Directives, no transitional periods have been granted. 
Acceding states also have a degree of flexibility regarding how directives are implemented as 
they lack detailed administrative templates. To date there is no clear picture of particular New 
Member States being habitual leaders or laggards regarding their responses to environmental 
Directives (Skjærseth and Wettestad, 2007). 
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The EU has relied on economic incentives to promote compliance in the CEEC2004 (in 
keeping with the external incentives model). The ‘benefit’ of membership has been conditional 
on adoption of the acquis with additional resources provided to support implementation. The 
funds available have been significant: between 1999 and 2004, under the ISPA pre-accession 
instrument approximately €500 million was allocated per year for environmental projects, 
principally for waste and water infrastructure (European Commission, 2004). A further €1 billion 
was dispersed to environmental related projects between 1990 and 2002 under the PHARE pre-
accession instrument (Auer, 2004). In addition, ‘soft mechanisms’ (Bieber and Vaerini, 2004) to 
improve compliance were introduced, such as twinning arrangements. The latter is designed for 
those in existing MS who apply the acquis to share expertise with their counterparts in acceding 
countries. This aided legal transposition and capacity building within national Ministries (Elliott, 
2005). However, both Elliott (2005) and Kružíková (2004) question the ability of twinning 
schemes and other learning programmes specifically designed to aid adoption of the acquis to 
alter practices and mindsets outside a rather small group of key civil servants. 
During this period, Serbia remained outside of the accession process. Since the end of the 
Milošević era, Serbia has been able to access some international resources but these are minor 
compared to the CEEC2004. For instance, the EU’s European Agency for Reconstruction 
in Serbia allocated €13 million to the environment sector between 2000 and 2002. This resource 
has gone mainly to the establishment of an Environmental Protection Agency and ‘green 
awareness-raising’ activities. Legislative reform has stumbled due to a lack of wider political 
salience for environmental matters and, in contrast to the CEEC2004, absence of the pressing 
necessity to adopt the acquis. This has prolonged underinvestment in, and maintenance of, 
environmental systems and infrastructure, particularly in wastewater treatment and water 
purification, which ultimately has led to a worsening of river and drinking water quality since 
1990 (UNECE, 2005).  
In the post-Milošević era, the only widespread national environmental debate has 
concerned the long-term effects of the NATO bombing in 1999 (Clarke, 2001). While clearly an 
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important topic, the preoccupation with this issue has eclipsed problems arising from domestic 
sources of environmental degradation or the possible challenges of EU membership. Funding has 
continued to be severely limited, and following reforms commenced in October 2000, the then 
Federal Ministry for Science, Development and the Environment and the Republic of Serbia’s 
Ministry for Environmental Protection were both abolished. In the latter case four levels of 
senior staff were removed (Minister, Deputy Minister, Director for Environmental Protection and 
all Assistant Directors). The responsibilities of the Ministry were initially incorporated into a 
Directorate for Environmental Protection within the Ministry of Health (REC, 2001).  
Environmental protection was again elevated to ministerial status in 2003 with the 
formation of a new Ministry for Protection of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection, 
which in 2004 merged with a smaller ministry for science, becoming the Ministry of Science and 
Environmental Protection (MSEP). However the MSEP has a limited remit by international 
standards, principally concerned with forestry, protected areas such as national parks and the 
growing problem of illegal dumping of hazardous wastes. Agricultural pollution is seen as a 
minor issue within the Ministry. Interviews conducted in 2004 in the MSEP revealed that 
officials had little knowledge or control over the restructuring of administrative frameworks and 
were demoralised. The next sub-section assesses compliance at the farm level before evaluating 
all evidence for the late 1990s onwards, in the light of the models of Europeanisation. 
 
Rule Adoption at the Farm Level in Serbia 
 
The most important domestic legislation governing agricultural water management 
remains the 1991 Water Law. It regulates: the use and management of waters as a public 
resource; protection of water sources; and the criteria and methods for water management, 
organization and financing. This law drew on earlier domestic and international experiences and 
should have provided the legal framework for basic water protection and control of use (UN, 
2004). It gives strict powers to the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Management to 
immediately stop or close down organisations which are in breach of the law. The law 
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centralised authority and resources to the republican level, replacing the previous system of self-
management.  
The Water Inspectorate is charged with identifying violations of the Water Law and can 
impose restraining orders (resenje) on violators and prepare court cases. However this agency is 
chronically under-funded. In 2006, the inspectorate had 68 planned positions but due to budget 
cuts only 35 inspectors were in place. These water inspectors are charged with investigating 
individual cases of legal breaches at the local level. In general there is one inspector per opština3, 
with two for the city of Belgrade. Inspectors cover both agricultural and industrial sources of 
water pollution, along with, if relevant, household cases. Their remit covers the use of water, 
water pollution control, extraction of sand and gravel, preservation of river banks and facilities in 
the water sector (i.e. drainage channels, dams, pumping stations). By January 2007 the 
Inspectorate had 27 Yugo cars, which were unsuitable for visiting off-road sites. This meant that 
some inspectors had no private vehicle and could only follow up reported cases that could be 
reached by public transport. On several occasions, the inspectorate had insufficient money to pay 
for petrol so inspectors were confined to their offices. Due to insufficient staffing there is no 
effective supervision or checking of the activities of inspectors. For example there have been 
several cases of illegal sand and gravel extraction, to which inspectors have turned a ‘blind eye’4 
and this has led to calls for a new tier of super-inspectors who would supervise and monitor 
activities.  
Inspectors each conduct around 125 visits per year based on information provided by 
members of the public, local authorities and the monitoring activities of the 
Hydrometeorological Zavod.5 Given the spectrum of activities covered by water inspectors only 
approximately five per cent of their time is spent on agricultural issues, mainly larger animal 
farms and dairy processors. Approximately a quarter of site visits result in the notification of 
orders to individuals or companies (about 1000-1100 per year for the whole Inspectorate), of 
                                                 
3
 Each opština is around 2500 km2 in size. 
4
 Interview with Former Minister of Agriculture (24thJanuary, 2007). 
5
 The state body in charge of monitoring water quality. 
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which about a third go to court (380-500 per annum). Legal proceedings are slow, with 
defendants able to use several delaying tactics. Even if a company is found guilty, fines are 
relatively small (typically far less than introducing effective prevention measures) or are just 
waived, as the alternative of closing down the company is viewed as more socially damaging. 
While these difficulties are not unique (Faure and Heine, 2005), Serbian courts have been 
particularly lenient toward enterprises which violate environmental regulations.  
The degree to which Serbian regulatory systems have broken down is illustrated by the 
farm survey data collected as part of the WATERWEB project. According to the 1991 Water 
Law, farmers should possess a permit or licence for water extraction from rivers, streams, bore 
holes and, in certain circumstances, from natural springs and wells. Survey data (Table 2) 
indicate that this is occurring only in a minority of cases. River or stream extraction was used as 
a source of water by 30 farmers, of which only 6 had a permit or licence. Similarly, bore holes 
were used by 25 farmers but only 6 were licensed. Natural springs or wells were utilised by 16 
farmers in the sample, but only one had the requisite use permit. These breaches of the 1991 Law 
are unlikely to be investigated because individually they are not classified as a priority by the 
overstretched Water Inspectorate. However the collective impact of unregulated water extraction 
on groundwater resources is significant (World Bank, 2003). 
 
Table 2: Water use by farmers and permit / license for extraction 
 Number of farmers 
reporting use without 
appropriate permit / 
licence 
Number with permit / 
license for extraction 
River or stream extraction 24 6 
Bore hole 19 6 
Natural spring /wells 15 1 
Source: survey data 
 
The survey also elicited farmers’ beliefs regarding the Serbian state’s ability to 
effectively regulate water use and agricultural pollution. Responses reveal strikingly little faith in 
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the regulatory system: only 5.4 per cent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the 
statement that ‘water use is effectively controlled by the state’. A similar lack of confidence is 
evident regarding the use of agri-chemicals and farm pollution: only 4.8 and 3.6 per cent of 
respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statements that ‘the use of agri-chemicals is 
effectively controlled by the state’ and ‘farm pollution is effectively monitored’ respectively. 
The problems highlighted in the survey data are recognised by key policy actors and a 
new Water Law has been drafted, which seeks to harmonise Serbia’s regulations with the Water 
Framework Directive of the European Union. There is a broad consensus amongst water officials 
that the present arrangements are failing and that harmonisation with the EU is desirable. 
Although this consensus exists, passage of the law has been stalled by the general governmental 
and parliamentary instability that besets Serbia. 
Evaluating the evidence for the late 1990s onwards with regard to the models of 
Europeanisation, it is apparent that for the CEEC2004 the external incentive of EU membership 
and its requirement to adopt the acquis led to wide ranging legal reform and some strengthening 
of administrative capacity which would not have occurred without the prospect of EU 
membership. As accession came closer greater importance was given to instrumental learning, 
which fitted with a rather a narrow focus on harmonisation with the acquis. While this type of 
learning supported formal compliance with EU rules, adherence in the sense of practical 
enforcement will prove more problematic (Kružíková, 2004). 
Recent farm level data suggest that Serbia shares many of the problems associated with 
the Mediterranean Syndrome. While the 1991 Water Law gives significant formal power to the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Management and its agencies, in practice these 
powers are unworkable. Regulatory failure is endemic: a whole swathe of illegal development 
and activities (such as blocking drainage channels, illegal access to existing water supplies, water 
extraction) remains unregulated. While such activities individually do not create major negative 
externalities, collectively their impact on public drinking supplies and waste management is 
pervasive. A legacy of the Milošević era is a public administration still prone to clientelism and 
 21
corruption. The full implementation of legislation, either of domestic or European origin, will 
founder because of weak administrative capacity at the local level. 
This generates the question – to what extent could external incentives and learning 
networks improve compliance at the farm level? If accession negotiations progress, Serbia would 
be able to access greater external resources to assist with implementation of the acquis, for 
example to modernise equipment and IT, and improve training at the Water Inspectorate. This 
would improve the efficiency of the agency and the latter sees EU membership as a means to 
leverage greater funding. However, the majority of resources required by domestic institutions 
for harmonisation, including staff and other operating costs, must come from national funds 
(Jehlička and Tickle, 2004). Given its low salience, environmental protection is not a priority for 
domestic funding. Moreover, the current state of the Serbian legal system and a wider civil 
culture which works against the production of environmental public goods will limit the impact 
of any external resources. As Kružíková (2004) notes for the Czech Republic, meshing together 
European law with a domestic legal system, based on fundamentally different principles and 
culture, is problematic. 
Several MS utilise learning networks as a mechanism for educating farmers about 
European legislation and to alter attitudes and practices (Kröger, 2005). The performance of such 
networks has been, however, patchy. As presented in Table 1, learning networks are most 
effective where a consensus exists that views present domestic arrangements as failing and EU 
rules as achievable, legitimate and superior. Serbia lacks such a consensus and is characterised 
by deep divisions on attitudes to the EU. There is no shared mindset of values and identity which 
Checkel (2001) views as critical for deep integration. Any attempt for the state to institute such 
networks are also likely to meet with suspicion, given farmers’ lack of faith in government, as 
evidenced in survey data. Moreover, Serbia’s fragmented farm structure – census data from 2002 
indicate the country possesses 780,000 farms – makes establishing all encompassing networks 
logistically and financially difficult. 
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Conclusions 
This paper comparatively analysed Serbia’s real regulation of agriculture’s use of water as a 
basis for engaging in wider debates on compliance with EU rules. Two cases of Europeanisation 
of environmental regulations are identified - firstly, in Yugoslavia during the socialist era and, 
secondly, in the CEEC2004, in the late 1990s onwards, prior to EU membership. The principal 
mechanisms differ between the two cases: a voluntary process of policy learning underpinned 
Europeanisation as part of a wider internationalisation during the socialist era in Yugoslavia, 
while for the CEEC2004 the external incentive of EU membership, which was dependent on 
implementation of the acquis, dominated. There is, therefore, no single mechanism for 
Europeanisation. The remainder of this paper reviews, in turn, the validity of the three models of 
Europeanisation in the light of the empirical evidence presented. 
External incentives underpinned the most significant case of Europeanisation of 
environmental laws, which occurred in CEEC2004 states prior to membership. Critical to the 
effectiveness of the process was the EU's ultimate sanction of withholding membership and 
progress in accession negotiations being linked to harmonisation with the acquis. Applicant 
states could not pick and choose regarding which EU rules to adopt. Notwithstanding 
negotiations for transition periods regarding a limited number of directives, rather than rational 
bargaining over specific pieces of legislation, the process depended on applicants adhering to a 
primary goal of membership. While effective in underpinning legal harmonisation in the case of 
the CEEC2004, external incentives are likely to prove less effective for Europeanisation in two 
other circumstances. Firstly, the EU must be, in accordance with an assumption of the policy 
learning approach, an ‘aspiration group’. The power of external incentives fades where 
membership is not a priority, as in the case of Serbia during the Milošević era. Secondly, existing 
MS may also have greater freedom than applicant countries to be laggards or refuseniks in 
complying with EU rules as the ultimate sanction of withholding membership, in the 
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terminology of Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005a) - reinforcement by punishment, is not 
applicable. Finally, while concentrating responsibility in the hands of a small group of civil 
servants, with legislative reform effectively bypassing national parliaments, aided speedy legal 
harmonisation prior to membership in the CEEC2004, it may confine Europeanisation to small, 
elite ‘islands’ within national Ministries. Practical adherence requires the involvement of a much 
wider set of actors. 
 Policy learning networks were effective in Europeanising some environmental laws in 
socialist Yugoslavia but their impact was minimal in the early to mid-1990s in either the 
CEEC2004 or Serbia. According to theories based on this approach, the effectiveness of policy 
learning approaches for Europeanisation depends on the level of domestic dissatisfaction, 
engagement of epistemic communities and transferability. The paper offers some evidence to 
support this. Socialist Yugoslavia possessed a relatively well educated and travelled epistemic 
community which facilitated policy learning. This community fragmented as Yugoslavia 
imploded. The transfer of EU rules was also seen as more appropriate in socialist Yugoslavia, 
consistent with learning from other developed, scientifically advanced states in a period of 
relative prosperity (Jancar, 1987), than in CEE in the early to mid-1990s, when environmental 
matters had little traction amidst economic decline, rising unemployment and only the distant 
possibility of accession to the EU. Checkel's notion that decision making cannot be reduced to a 
pure bargaining model and that the EU must be regarded as a aspiration group for significant 
adoption of EU rules to occur, is critical to understanding the process of Europeanisation in CEE. 
However the assumption that sincere discursive adoption necessarily leads to consistent 
behavioural adaptation appears unfounded. For instance, Yugoslavia’s epistemic community was 
far more effective in promoting legal harmonisation than in stimulating wider changes in 
operating habits that were necessary for practical adherence. As with much of the writing on 
external incentives, the focus of policy learning models on government adoption of EU rules is 
too narrow for effectively studying compliance issues. Finally regarding the policy learning 
model, although the most significant case of Europeanisation occurred as part of the accession 
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process, in the CEEC2004 states in the late 1990s onwards, which was built principally on 
external incentives, policy learning networks still played an important role, facilitating 
instrumental learning. For instance twinning arrangements assisted the exchange of knowledge 
on implementation of the acquis. In this regard rather than seeing the external incentives and 
policy learning models as competing approaches for Europeanisation, complementarities are 
apparent. 
 La Spina and Sciortino (1993) argue that non-compliance with both domestic and 
European rules is rooted in three factors that constitute the ‘Mediterranean syndrome’: a civic 
culture that sanctions non-compliant behaviour, administrative structures that undermine 
enforcement, and a delegitimised bureaucracy. In all eras considered, some commonalities 
between Serbia and the ideal type of the Mediterranean syndrome can be drawn. During the 
socialist era, administrative structures, particularly the system of self-management, undermined 
practical enforcement and a party-industrial elite sanctioned non-complaint behaviour with 
environmental rules where the latter threatened production. Compliance reached a nadir during 
the Milošević era when the probity of public institutions also fell sharply. As evidenced by 
survey data, Serbian farmers’ faith in environmental regulation remains extremely weak and 
non-compliance widespread. The Serbian case therefore supports the view that La Spina and 
Sciortino identify critical determinants of non-compliance. Such determinants are likely to affect 
implementation of all environmental regulation, regardless of domestic or European origin. 
However the model is essentially static; it does not specifically address how patterns of 
compliance change over time and the approach is weak on solutions. This calls for further 
research, studying how practical enforcement can be best engendered in inauspicious 
environments. However this should not detract from the important insight that studies of 
European rule adoption require a consideration of practical enforcement, and how this may pose 
similar difficulties for European and domestic generated regulation alike.  
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